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CONVERTING PALESTINIANS INTO ‘INFILTRATORS’ IN THEIR OWN HOME COUNTRY: A NEW 
MILITARY ORDER AND SAME OLD POLICY  
Asem Khalil, Ph.D.* 
 
 
I. Introduction 
A new Israeli military “Order regarding Prevention of Infiltration”, Order no.1650 of 2009, took 
effect on 13 April 2010, six months after being signed by the Israeli Commander of IDF (Israeli 
Defense Forces) in the “Judea and Samaria Area”.1 It is an amendment to a previously enforced 
Order no. 329 of 1969,2 almost as old as the occupation itself.3 Leading daily newspapers reported 
the alarming news and many International, Israeli and Palestinian human rights organizations 
protested. A Palestinian Authority official talked about “Apartheid” while an Israeli Military officer 
claimed that “[the amendment] makes it easier for people without the right paperwork to appeal.”4 
The objective of this paper is to analyze this military order in the light of older ones, in order to 
investigate how this new order fits within the same old Israeli occupation policy: maximizing the 
control of (Palestinian) land and minimizing the number of (Palestinian) people. In fact, despite the 
many changes introduced by military orders throughout more than four decades of occupation, this 
overarching policy goes crescendo since 1967. Following Oslo Accords, which did not put an end to 
the occupation, such policies intensified.  
                                               
* Research Fellow at the Global Hauser, New York University, Assistant Professor of Law, Birzeit University. 
akhalil@birzeit.edu  
1 The text is in Hebrew. An unofficial translation was made available by Hamoked, at: 
http://www.hamoked.org.il/items/112301_eng.pdf .  
2 An unofficial translation of this order is made available online by Hamoked, at: 
http://www.hamoked.org.il/items/112300_eng.pdf  
3 Order no. 1650 of 2009 is the second amendment to order no. 329 of 1969 (which was itself a replacement of older 
order no. 125 of 1967).  The first amendment was effectuated by order no. 831 of 1980. All military orders referred to in 
this paper, unless otherwise specified, are from Birzeit University Database: http://muqtafi2.birzeit.edu/ .  
4 Isabel Kershner, Human Rights Groups Warn of New Powers for Israel, N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2010, at 8. 
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In the wake of the June 1967 war, Israel took complete control of the West Bank, previously under 
Jordanian rule5, and Gaza Strip, administered until then by Egypt.6 Despite the restrictions imposed 
by international law applicable in times of occupation, Israel – that does not admit being an 
occupation power, at first place – started a systematic change of the existent legal system(s) in force 
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; through law-like tools (military declarations and orders) and 
enforced by Israeli military courts. Not only did Israel maintain legal and administrative separation 
between the West Bank and Gaza Strip, it also reinforced it; separate military command and, in later 
stage, Civil Administrations were established to rule the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Each (Israeli) 
area commander issued hundreds of military orders.7  
It is true that Israel rarely uses explicit words that clearly state its (discriminatory) policy towards 
Palestinians; however it is naïve to expect that from any contemporary state, especially from a 
country, like Israel, which declares itself a democracy. Military orders, nonetheless, show a 
continuum in Israeli policies towards Palestinian land and population. Three case studies will be 
analyzed: first, the way residency status is regulated which determines who legal and illegal residents 
are; second, the regulation of crossing borders and movement of Palestinians within the occupied 
Palestinian territory and to the outside world; third, family unification of Palestinians in the occupied 
territory. I will first analyze the new military order and the difference it makes.8  
                                               
5 The West Bank refers to that territory that lies between the river Jordan and Israel proper, i.e. Israel in its pre-1967 
borders; it fell under Jordanian rule in 1948 but was unified to the Emirate of Transjordan, forming the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan in 1950; a constitution was adopted in 1952 and a New Nationality Law was adopted in 1954, in 
which West Bank Palestinians became Jordanian nationals. East Jerusalem, previously part of the West Bank, came 
under Israeli law, which extended boundaries on 28 June 1967 and was formally annexed on 30 July 1980. See LEX 
TAKKENBERG, THE STATUS OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 211 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998). 
6 Those zones forms what is called in UN resolutions occupied Palestinian territory. Israel had also occupied the Golan 
Heights – that was part of Syria and Sinai Peninsula which remained under Israeli control until it was returned to Egypt 
under the 1979 Peace Treaty. See id.  
7 For this reason, limiting analyses to Israeli military orders applicable in West Bank will be enough for the arguments I 
raise in this paper. Two other reasons why I limit my analysis to military orders applicable in West Bank: first, the new 
order of concern is issued by the Israeli Area Commander of Judea and Samaria (i.e. the biblical terms, used by Israel 
that covers, extends grosso modo to what is the West Bank). Second, following Oslo agreements, military governments 
were maintained in both West Bank and Gaza Strip. However, in 2005, following the unilateral disengagement plan 
effectuated by Israel, the military government was officially put to an end, while any remaining civil affairs of Palestinians 
of Gaza (population registry, requests of family unification, etc.) were transferred to Central Command Area. 
8 Those case studies were developed and analyzed in details through various research projects I have conducted in 
collaboration with CARIM – European University Institute; in particular: Asem Khalil, Family Unification in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory (San Domenico di Fiesole, Robert Shuman Center for Advances Studies, CARIM Analytic & 
Synthetic Notes No. 2009/19, 2009). Asem Khalil, Irregular Migration into and through the Occupied Palestinian Territory (San 
Domenico di Fiesole, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, CARIM Analytic and Synthetic Notes 2008/79,  
2009). 
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The above analysis will show similar traits that all military orders share, an overarching 
(discriminatory) policy. Most importantly, the fact that this policy is targeting a specific national 
group rather than others, and the fact that it is accompanied by persistent settlement policy in the 
occupied Palestinian territories – which Israel still refers to in biblical names9 – renders these 
policies, not only discriminatory, but also racist and colonial.  
This paper constitutes a critique to law as a tool of social control whenever motivated and 
accompanied by racist and colonial policies. Such policies render Palestinians’ dreams of a (viable 
and connected) state, within historical Palestine and side by side Israel, impossible. Such a critique is 
possible only if one admits that legality, as a political ideal, is intrinsically related to freedom and 
equality. Otherwise, legality is converted to legalism. The rule by and through law – like enactments 
whenever disconnected from the two values of legality convert law to a monster, often distrusted, 
feared and resisted by those who endure its burden.  
II. The ‘New’ Military Order  
As mentioned above,10 order no. 1650 of 2009 is an amendment11 to earlier Order no. 329 of 1969.12 
The latter is composed of 10 sections. As it is the case with other orders, the first section often 
contains definitions (if any) while last sections are concerned with formalities: cancellation of 
previous orders if any (section 8), the date of entry into effect (section 9), and the name that is given 
to the order itself (section 10). The sections in between dealt with: sentencing of the infiltrator 
(section 2), deportation of the infiltrator (section 3), sentencing of armed infiltrator (section 4), 
evidence (section 5), unlawful stay following expiration of permit (section 6), and obtaining permit 
under false pretences (section 7).  
                                               
9 Order 187 of 1967 stated that ‘Judea and Samaria’ will be interpreted in all military orders as equivalent to west Bank. 
10 See supra texts accompanying notes 1-3.  
11 The first amendment was in Order no.831 of 1980, that included minor change, an addition to article 3-B.  
12 Order no.329 of 1969 was a substitution to an earlier order no.125 of 1967 adopted in September 21. The latter 
substituted an earlier order no.106 adopted in that same year, in the afterword of Israeli occupation of the West Bank. 
Two interesting changes between order no.329 and order 125: first, order no.125 defined the ‘area’ as being the ‘area’ of 
the West Bank, while order no.329 ignored such a definition all together; second, while in order 125 it is the IDF area 
commander, or the one delegated by him, who is empowered to deport any infiltrator, order 329 empowers any military 
commander to take such a decision. The deportation decision in both decrees shall be in written.  
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Order no. 1650 contains nine sections that introduce changes to almost all sections of Order no. 
329. In what follows I will present only some of the changes that were introduced.13 At first 
instance, it appears that the order includes (as rightly pointed out by the Israeli official cited above) 
new guarantees for what can be largely called a ‘due process’. This is the case for example with 
regards to the inclusion of three new subsections after 3-A which impose conditions for the issuance 
of deportation order including “the opportunity to plead before an IDF or Police officer and until 
the infiltrator’s claims had been brought to the attention of the military commander” or that the 
infiltrator is “given information in writing or orally, as far as possible in a language he understands, 
regarding his rights under this Order”. Similarly newly introduced subsections C and D (that are 
now added to section 3 of the previous Order) regulate the way deportation is implemented. The 
newly introduced subsection 3-C states that “the infiltrator shall not be deported unless 72 hours 
had elapsed from the time he was served the written deportation order.” Newly introduced article 6 
states the possibility of release on bail, if certain conditions are met. This impression however is 
misleading. As always, the devil is in the details.  
What can be considered an apparently minimal change in the definition as stated in the first section, 
has actually changed the whole meaning of the order, as much as the consequences in terms of 
possible deportation of thousands of Palestinians.  
Old Order no. 329 defined in section 1-B an infiltrator as “a person who entered the Area 
knowingly and unlawfully after having been present in the east bank of the Jordan, Syria, 
Egypt or Lebanon following the effective date.”14 Instead, the new subsection now reads: “[An 
infiltrator is] a person who entered the Area unlawfully following the effective date, or a person who is 
present in the Area and does not lawfully hold a permit.”15  
a) The fact that “knowingly” is no more necessary as a condition to consider someone as an 
infiltrator means that having any irregularity in the documents – thus, not being an infiltrator will 
exclusively depend on continuously changing regulations introduced by new military orders, 
even if those who became infiltrators are not even aware of that fact. Meanwhile, unlawful is 
                                               
13 I will not refer to formal changes, but only to some of the most relevant substantial changes that the new order had 
introduced as much as needed to support the claims I advanced earlier in this paper. Although Hebrew is the official 
language, I will use the English version of the two orders as point of departure for my analysis. See supra notes 1 and 2. 
14 That is 7/6/1967, as in section 1 of order 125 of 1969. Emphasis in bold is mine, indicating parts of the definition 
that was simply deleted from the definition that the new order had introduced.  
15 Emphasis in italic is mine, indicating additions introduced to the older subsection.  
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defined exclusively as not being in the capacity of proving the possession of a document or a 
permit issued by the IDF commander or from Israel proper, as appears in Section 5-B, 
introduced by Order no. 1650.16  
b) Order no. 329 limited the scope of the definition of infiltrator to those who have been present 
in the four countries surrounding Israel – where most Palestinian refugees and displaced are 
present. The fact that there is no such condition in the new order means that: First, those who 
entered the area from other countries and overstayed their permit will now be considered 
infiltrators. Second, some of those present in the West Bank, who are born and raised there and 
who have never been outside it, may now be considered infiltrators if they cannot prove their 
legal stay (i.e. having lawful document or permit, according to newly introduced Section 5-B). 
Third, the most important change is considering Palestinians of Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem 
as infiltrators given that the ‘Area’ refers only to ‘Judea and Samaria’.  
c) The fact that a new option is available in the newly introduced section 1-B (“or a person who is 
present in the Area and does not lawfully hold a permit”) confirms what has been suspected 
above. In fact, Palestinians who are residents of Gaza Strip have a different ID card than that of 
those in the West Bank (even though Israel controls both populations registry). This provision 
means they need to have a permit from the Israeli authorities in order to stay in the West Bank, 
as if they were foreigners, or otherwise they will be considered unlawful and, accordingly, will be 
treated as ‘infiltrators’. A similar argument can be advanced against Palestinians of East 
Jerusalem who have Israeli issued ID card, who are considered permanent residents in Israel 
proper (since Israel annexed East Jerusalem).  
Another significant change was introduced in section 2 of Order no. 329: “The infiltrator shall be 
subject to a penalty of a term of imprisonment of fifteen years or a fine of 10,000 Israeli Lira or 
both.”17 Instead new section 2, now composed in two subsections, reads: “A. The infiltrator shall be 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment of seven years. B. The provisions of Subsection (A) notwithstanding, 
                                               
16 Newly introduced article 5-B now states: “A lawful document or permit” – a document or permit issued by the 
commander of IDF forces in the Judea and Samaria Area or someone acting on his behalf under the provisions of 
security legislation, or issued by the authorities of the State of Israel under the Entry into Israel Law, 5712-1952, as it is 
periodically valid inside Israel, which permit the presence of a person in the Area.” It shall be noted that a shorter 
definition of “lawfully” was present in previous order 125 now deleted expressly by new order.  
17 Emphasis in bold is mine, indicating parts of the provision that was simply deleted from the new section 2. 
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where an infiltrator has proven his entry into the area was lawful – he shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 
three years.”18 This means that: 
(a) It is true that the penalty is reduced to seven years (instead of 15); however, this reduction is 
accompanied by the exclusion of an option that was available according to the previous Order, 
i.e. the “fine”. Accordingly, the only possible sentence for infiltrators will be imprisonment. In 
case of a deportation order – as per section 3-B of Order no. 329 (maintained without change in 
the new order) – the person will be released for the purposes of executing the deportation order, 
even before the end of the detention period. The newly introduced article 6 provides that it is 
now possible to “charge the expenses of executing a deportation order, including the expenses 
incurred by holding in custody, on the infiltrator[.]” 
(b) The new provision in section 2-B distinguishes the sentence term of imprisonment for those 
who entered the ‘Area’ lawfully but overstayed their permit from those who entered unlawfully. 
This distinction is not relevant whenever it comes to a possible order of deportation, which 
applies equally to both kinds of ‘infiltrators’.  
One may argue that this is a legitimate concern of any sovereign state; it may be deemed harsh but 
still within the possible responses many other states undertake to combat illegal stay, some would 
say. Such measures may include, but are not limited to deportation. In what follows,19 I will show 
how Israel converted hundreds of thousands of Palestinians into illegal in their home country, 
through successive Israeli military orders. The fact that legality depends exclusively on proving 
possession of ‘lawful’ documents or permits – which is the exclusive prerogative of the IDF 
commander and, accordingly, of Israel, in control of borders of the occupied Palestinian territory, as 
much as of the population registry since 1967 – renders the status of legal or illegal stay completely 
dependent on Israeli regulation and not necessarily on actions undertaken by Palestinians.  
Others may object and say that this is the ‘law’; period. But what is ‘law’? Do those military orders 
include real rules of law? In other words, do those military orders respect the principle of legality? In 
what follows I do not promise to give an exhaustive answer to what the Rule of Law is (Nobody 
does!) or even to what the law is; there are indeed different approaches to and different conceptions 
of the law. In the conclusion, however, I will reflect on those conceptions of law and legality that 
                                               
18 Emphasis in italic is mine, indicating additions introduced to the older section 
19 See infra sections III-VII.  
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has been used by Israel to facilitate its policies, and reduce the (moral and political) costs of 
maintaining the occupation structure for more than 43 years.20   
III. Regulating Residency Status  
The term ‘resident’ was used (for the first time21) in Israeli Military Order no. 65, issued in 18 August 
1967, referring to those who have permanent residency in the ‘Area’. In subsequent Israeli military 
orders, however, this term was used to indicate those who are ‘legally’ present in the ‘Area’ and have 
their permanent residence therein.22 Legal presence, however, depends on the fact of being counted 
in the census realized by Israeli military government in the West Bank, as soon as September 1967.23  
Palestinians who – for whatever reason – were not counted or registered, became illegal overnight, 
regardless of their physical presence in the West Bank, even before the Israeli full control of the 
‘Area’. By military orders their physical presence became illegal, because they didn’t have what Israel 
deemed lawful documentation. From an Israeli perspective, being illegal meant they were not 
supposed to be there, and, in order to stay legally where they were already, they needed a permit, as if 
they were non-resident foreigners. As non-residents, they also needed an Israeli authorization to 
have a job and to perform commercial activities, among other things. Uncounted Palestinians, 
deemed illegally present, became susceptible, and were often subjected to various sanctions, 
including fines and imprisonment; many were deported despite the fact that they had no other place 
where they had a legal title of stay.  
Those who duly registered, they were candidates for an ID number. The way ID numbers were 
granted was strictly regulated by various orders. In fact, Order no. 234 concerning ID cards was 
issued on 17 March 1968,24 substituted less than a year after by a much more detailed Order no. 297 
of 1969, and amended 23 times until 1995.25  
                                               
20 See infra Part VIII. 
21 See SHAML, AL-NAZEHOUN AL-FALESTENEYYOUN WAL MUFAWADAT AL-SALAM [DISPLACED PALESTINIANS AND 
PEACE NEGOTIATIONS] 89 (Ramallah, Shaml 1996). 
22 Such as in Israeli Military Orders No. 234 concerning ID Cards (Issued on 17 March 1968) later on substituted by 
Order No. 297 concerning Identity Cards and Population Registration (Issued on 8 January 1969).  
23 In parallel, censuses had taken place also in East Jerusalem and in Gaza Strip. In what follows all references will be 
done exclusively to the West Bank, unless otherwise indicated.  
24 This Order was simple and brief (6 articles only); it permits for males, who are 16 years old and legally residing in the 
‘area’, to request an ID card before 1 August 1968. This means that the ID card is not a right to pretend but a grant by 
the IDF commander that those entitled to may request; i.e. it can be negated if any of the conditions (imposed by the 
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Order no. 297 of 1969 regulated the way the population can be registered (cases of deaths and 
births). Contrary to Order no. 234 of 1968, this Order imposed on ‘males over 16 years old’ to request 
an ID card, to hold it at all times, and show it whenever requested by an IDF soldier or an 
authorized person while it permitted for females over 16 years old, to request an ID card.26 According 
to Order no. 297, an ID card includes, inter alia, religion, nationality, spouse name, children names, 
date of birth, sex, and address.27 The same order imposed on residents to inform the Israeli 
authorities about any birth within 10 days, if the birth took place in the ‘Area’ and 30 days if it 
happened outside. The Order also imposed sanctions (which range goes from a fine to one year in 
prison) on those who transgress any of its provisions.  
Order no. 1206 of 1987 amended (article 11a Para.15 of) Order no. 297 of 1969, imposing that ID 
cards shall include (besides the name, date of birth and sex of children) the ID number; this means 
that ID number was given since then to kids at birth and not, as before, when an ID card could be 
requested (16 years old). As for the registration of new born children, the order extended the period 
for the registration of children for resident parents, to 16 years (instead of 10 days) if born in the 
‘area’, and five years (instead of 30 days) if born outside the ‘Area’.  
Order no. 1206 was to a certain extent ‘revolutionary’ – on the light of historical (or even regional) 
experiences related to transmission of legal status to children – in that it linked the registration of 
children to their mothers, not to their fathers. According to that order only children of resident 
females could be registered within five years of the date of their birth. Some suspected that this 
change was motivated by the fact that there are more chances to have resident males married to 
non-residents than the contrary; thus linking children to the mothers serves Israel’s interest to 
                                                                                                                                                       
IMG) are not respected. Besides, it means that it was not obligatory to request an ID card nor was it possible for all 
(males over 16 years old exclusively).  
25 The Institute of Law - University of Birzeit in Al-Muqtafi had collected most available legislations including Israeli 
Military Orders in Al-Muqtafi database; according to that source, the last amendment that could be collected is Order 
no. 1421 concerning Identity Cards and Population Registration (Amendment no. 23), issued on 17 January 1995.   
26 Order no.396 had amended Order no. 297 of 1969 and interestingly distinguished between the ‘area’ and the 
“Controlled Area”, referring to those territories that fall under Israeli Military Army less the ‘area’. Since the order makes 
reference to Israel and to Jerusalem in explicit way, the researcher understanding of the “controlled area” is to cover 
Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, and until 1980s, Sinai. The order also forbids those having obtained an ID number from 
Israel or Controlled Area to obtain an ID number issued for residents of the ‘area’.  
27 Order no. 996 of 1982 added two elements to be included on the ID card: the date and place of entry; the date the 
person becomes a resident.  
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reduce the number of Palestinians in the ‘Area’.28 This change produced strange situations in which a 
family with a non-resident mother may end up with children who are residents and others who are 
not, depending on the date of their birth; e.g. if they are born before 12 August 1987 (the date Order 
no. 1206 was signed and entered into effect) then he/she is a resident; otherwise they are not. 
Besides, children of resident parents who were not registered duly on time, whether for parents’ 
negligence or even simply as a result of their ignorance of the timeframe restriction, were simply 
denied registration and, hence, an ID number.  
Those unregistered children of non-resident women or who were not registered duly on time were 
considered illegally present, despite being born and raised in the ‘Area’. An administrative irregularity 
converted them into ghosts (legally speaking) despite their physical presence in the ‘Area’. 
Accordingly, for Israel those unregistered persons are de iure inexistent, but whom de facto presence is 
sometimes tolerated by Israel. As such, their presence as a matter of fact will always be dependent 
on Israeli policies towards their ‘illegal presence’. The only way for them to be registered is to apply 
for family unification; a complicated, long and expensive procedure which results are never 
guaranteed. 
It shall be noted that Order no. 1421 of 1995 included ‘positive’ changes to Order no. 1206 of 
1987.29 For example, it prolonged the registration period for children of residents to 18 years old, 
regardless of the place of their birth and enabled registration of children whom at least one of the 
two parents is a resident, as it was the case before August 1987. However, it added that this is 
possible on the condition that the Israeli authority is convinced that the applicant permanent 
residence is in the ‘Area’. This means that a space was left for the discretion of the Israeli authority 
to decide in each case whether to register – thus to grant an ID number – or not. Accordingly, many 
children whom parents’ permanent residence is not the ‘Area’ – upon the discretionary conviction of 
Israeli officials in charge of registering new births – may simply be denied registration. In other 
words, although changes over time – as shown by last Order no. 1421 – may have been considered 
less restrictive, they nonetheless constitute an episode in the same overarching Israeli policy.  
                                               
28 See SHAML, supra note 21, at 99.  
29 Interestingly enough, the order included provisions that seem to be at least ‘theoretically’ (because it was never 
effectively enforced) less restrictive than the Interim Agreement itself. 
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V. Regulating Population Access and Exit  
For Palestinians who were outside the ‘Area’ occupied by Israel in 1967, as much as for those who 
fled because of the war, they were denied re-admission. The fact that they were not counted in the 
census Israel conducted resulted in denying them residency; as non-residents they couldn’t get 
readmitted without prior authorization (by Israel, now in full control of the borders) as if they were 
foreigners. Actually, as a result of the war, a second massive wave of displacement for hundreds of 
thousands of Palestinians took place. Those new nazeheen (displaced) – a word used to distinguish 
them from lage’een (refugees) of 1948 – were denied reentry to the West Bank and Gaza Strip – 
considered by the United Nations ‘occupied Palestinian territory’.30  
The pervert logic that Israel applied (that is similar to the way Israel, dealt with Palestinian refugees 
in 194831) is tricky; it can be formulated as if the Israeli authorities were saying: A) if you are a 
resident of the ‘Area’ you can be readmitted through borders; B) in order to be a resident, you need 
to be counted in the census; C) in order to be counted, you need to be in the ‘Area’. Meaning, those 
Palestinians who were outside the ‘Area’ at the time the census took place were not granted 
residency because they were not present; and they could not return to the ‘Area’ to be counted and 
registered because they were not residents!  
The tragedy of those thousands of Palestinians is not only that they were not re-admitted or that 
they became refugees/displaced persons because of the war; many became stateless and without any 
legal title of stay in third countries. Those ‘lucky’ Palestinians having temporary legal title of stay in 
foreign countries became unlawful once their title expired without ever being re-admitted back to 
the occupied Palestinian territory. For those Palestinians (refugees, stateless and denied reentry) they 
became ‘illegal’ and ‘unlawful’ – and accordingly undesired – wherever they were or went, regardless 
of whatever they did. Their existence, not to consider their movement, was and still is, regarded with 
suspicion, not only by the state that is currently occupying their homeland and controlling its 
borders, but also by host countries which were trapped in a dilemma: dealing with this massive 
                                               
30 The most recent endorsement of this position can be found in the position held by the International Court of Justice 
in its advisory opinion concerning the “Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory”, issued on July 9, 2004, see summary of the opinion available at: http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/131/1677.pdf  
31 Palestinian refugees, who left historical Palestine prior and during the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, were 
denied re-entry, because they were not Israeli citizens while they were denied Israeli citizenship because they were not in 
Israel. See Asem Khalil, Palestinian Nationality and Citizenship: Current challenges and Future Perspectives 25-7 (San Domenico di 
Fiesole, European University Institute, CARIM Research Report 2007/08, 2007). 
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humanitarian challenge while refusing to contribute to the Israeli policies by integrating those new 
‘refugees’. Similarly, third countries – possible target (whether for work, study or even immigration) 
of those stateless Palestinians – were also suspicious.  
As for those who remained in the ‘Area’ and counted in the census, they were deemed residents. 
Their legal status however depended on their day to day satisfaction of whatever conditions, old and 
new, the Israeli occupation authorities imposed. The fact that Israel used ‘residency’ to describe the 
status of Palestinians in the ‘Area’ indicates that Palestinians were treated by Israel as foreigners and 
aliens, regardless of the fact that they, as much as their ancestors, were present before the 
occupation took place in 1967.  
Residency status is not secure nor is particularly empowering. In fact, having a residency does not 
imply that the holder has a legal status; i.e. the ‘right to have rights’, as other countries treat their 
citizens or permanent residents. Rather, the consequences of being granted legal residency are often 
implied in a negative form. Israeli military orders explicitly state what non-residents cannot do 
without prior authorization (for example, non-residents cannot open, manage or work in any 
commercial activity without a permit from an authorized Israeli official) implying what residents are 
tolerated to do (without prior Israeli authorization). The fact that they are tolerated to do certain 
things means that their freedom is not a right but rather a result of benevolent action of the 
authorities. According to this logic, restrictions imposed by the Israeli authorities may take place at 
any time and for any reason, even without explicit suspension of those margins of actions tolerated 
for legal residents. 
Residents’ ‘good behavior’ (from an Israeli perspective) was not the only determinant factor for 
those Palestinians to remain what they became. They were often denied their status for simple changes 
in Israeli policies and orders, without even taking any action (whether bad or good). Since this status 
is not an entitlement, nor a right, any reason was enough for hundreds of Palestinians to lose their 
residency status. This means that any legally resident Palestinian in the ‘Area’ could at any time be 
converted to an illegal resident – thus having their ID number revoked by the Israeli authorities. 
This was the case of hundreds of Palestinians who were deported and had their ID cards revoked 
based on Israeli political and security pretensions. The same applied to many others who were 
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denied reentry when they exceeded the period of time permitted for their stay abroad or whenever 
their travel document (Israeli-issued laissez passer) expired while abroad.32  
In fact, in case of departure through the Israeli Airport,33 a resident of the ‘Area’ had to obtain a 
Laissez Passer issued for that purpose. In case the travel document is not renewed within a year, the 
ID card, thus the status of resident, was automatically revoked. Those who traveled using a permit 
(through the Allenby Bridge crossing) and remained outside the ‘Area’ for more than six years had 
their residency status revoked as well.34 Following Oslo Accords, Palestinians could obtain a 
Palestinian Authority travel document – valid for three years; hence restrictions on exit were 
cancelled. However, thousands of Palestinians whom ID cards were revoked before Oslo Accords 
were signed, were still considered by Israel as non-residents and cannot enter the ‘Area’ unless they 
obtain a permit (issued by Israel) as visitors or if they receive a new ID number following a 
successful family unification procedure.   
Israel, indeed, holds de facto supreme power on borders of the occupied Palestinian territory, as much 
as it controls the movement between the West Bank and Gaza Strip, for both residents and non-
residents alike. The establishment of the Palestinian Authority on parts of the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip did not change this reality. The hundreds of thousands of the new personnel of the new 
Palestinian bureaucracy made their ‘return’ to the so-called “Autonomous Territories” as a result of 
a deal with Israel, in which the list of ‘returnees’ was approved name by name. Those who Israel 
approved were granted an ID card.  
VI. Family Unification  
Those who are not registered in the population registry can acquire a residency status in the ‘Area’ 
exclusively through family unification. Otherwise, they need to obtain a visitor’s permit, granted by 
                                               
32 See generally SHAML, supra note 21, at 12-3.  
33 Palestinians residents (those holding ID card) were forbidden from using Israeli airport, while at the same time, no 
airport for the Palestinians was constructed following Israeli attack and complete destruction of Gaza International 
airport. This leaves the ID holders’ Palestinians with unique possibility to travel abroad through land, by Allenby Bridge 
in West Bank, and Rafah in Gaza Strip. Palestinians of Gaza willing to use Allenby crossing point needs special permit 
from Israel, and vice versa.  
34  See SHAML, supra note 21, at 94. Having their permit renewed by family members each year after the third year of 
departure. In case of lack of renewal of permit after the third year, ID card is revoked.  
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the Israeli Civil Administration’s staff officer for interior affairs, as much as if they were a  foreigner 
willing to visit the ‘Area’ temporarily.35  
Requests of family unification are not filed directly by non-residents, rather by resident relatives on 
their behalf. Those for whom family unification requests are filed are often Palestinian nationals –
not foreigners, properly speaking36- who were artificially converted into foreigners by consecutive 
Israeli military orders. They can be, but are not limited to: 1) persons who were present in the ‘Area’ 
but not counted in the census of 1967, 2) Palestinians displaced as a result of the 1967 war, 3) 
Palestinians who happened to be outside the ‘Area’ at the time Israel occupied the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip, 4) Palestinians whose residency was revoked following their ‘prolonged’ stay abroad; 5) 
children of residents who were not registered duly on time; as much as 6) children of non-resident 
mother who were born between 1987 and 1995.  
Regardless of the fact they were Palestinian nationals, the outcome of family unification requests 
depended on Israeli interest rather than on Palestinian. Approving a request for family unification is 
not considered as satisfying a legal entitlement of individuals but simply as a "special benevolent act 
of the Israeli authorities."37 This attitude makes sense if one considers that, for Israel, residency 
status is not considered as a vested right, in the first place, but a ‘privilege’ unilaterally granted. Since it 
is a grant, it can be denied for any reason and it can be revoked at any time.  
Israeli policy in terms of approving family unification varied with time, according to political 
circumstances. Israel indeed applied throughout the decades of occupation restrictive policies with 
regards to requests of family unification.38 The number of Palestinian families affected by those 
restrictions is very high.39 The largest group in need of family unification remains families where one 
                                               
35 See Leena Abu Mukh, Movement to and from the Palestinian Territories under Israeli Occupation after Oslo (1993-2006) 2 (San 
Domenico di Fiesole, European University Institute, CARIM Research Report 2006/02, 2006).  
36 The term foreigner is problematic. I use it here to identify non-Palestinian nationals. For Israel, anyone who is not 
resident of the area is dealt with as foreigner, and needs the same permit for entry and stay to the areas as much as any 
other foreigner.   
37 To quote state attorney’s office in response of 18 November 1992, Section 7, in the Israeli Supreme Court Case 
4494/91. Cited in: B'Tselem, Perpetual Limbo: Israel's Freeze on Unification of Palestinian Families in the Occupied Territories 8, 
2006, http://www.btselem.org/Download/200607_Perpetual_Limbo_Eng.doc.   
38 Restrictions intensified in times of ‘violence’ (for example following the second Intifada in 2001, for example) or as a 
result of political pressure on the Palestinian Authority (for example following Hamas victory in 2006 elections). 
39 A survey carried out among Palestinian residents of the oPt in October 2005 “shows that, 17.2 percent of the 
respondents have at least one first-degree relative (father, mother, brother, sister, wife, or child) who is not registered in 
the population registry and therefore is prevented from obtaining an identity card. Among the participants in the survey, 
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of the spouses is not a resident, and needs this procedure to be able to live together with their 
spouse in the occupied Palestinian territory.40  
The reduced number of approvals to family unification requests suggests that Israel’s policy was to 
minimize the number of approvals,41 and privileged agreeing only on exceptional cases where the 
humanitarian nature is particularly proven or when it is in favor of Israeli authorities’ interest.42 
Although for Israel, the issue of family unification (of Palestinians in the occupied territory) is often 
presented as a security or a political issue,43 the real justification behind its policy may be effectively 
                                                                                                                                                       
78.4 percent stated that the family unification request filed on behalf of these persons had not yet been processed. These 
figures show that more than 72,000 nuclear families in which at least one family member had a family unification request 
filed on his or her behalf are directly affected by Israel's freeze policy.” B'Tselem, supra note 37, at 20-1.  
Amnesty International estimated that by 2006 at least 120,000 families were affected by Israeli restrictions on family life. 
Moreover, since 2006 the number of families affected by such restrictions has increased. Amnesty International, 
Israel/Occupied Palestinian Territories: Right to Family Life Denied; Foreign Spouses of Palestinians Barred, MDE 15/018/2007, 
Mar. 21, 2007, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE15/018/2007/en/399e2f88-d3a7-11dd-a329-
2f46302a8cc6/mde150182007en.pdf.  
40  See B'Tselem, supra note 37, at 7. 
41 As admitted by Rabin, by then Minister of Defence, in a letter to Knesset Member in 16/11/1989: from 1967-1987, 
only 15% of the 85163 demands have been accepted, while from 1987 to 1989, only 20% of the 3266 were accepted. See 
SHAML, supra note 21, at 103.  
According to data from the Ministry of Defense collected by B’Tselem, during 1989, 24% of the requests for unification 
of West Bank families and 63% of the requests of families from the Gaza Strip were approved.  In the first seven 
months of 1990, 41% of the requests from the West Bank and 71% of the requests from the Gaza Strip were approved. 
According to the data for 1989 obtained from the Office of the Coordinator of Activities in the Territories, of the 1053 
requests for family unification submitted in the West Bank, 250 were approved, and of the 305 submitted in the Gaza 
Strip, 192 were approved.  In1990, through the end of July, 139 of the 334 requests submitted in the West Bank were 
approved, and of the 261 requests from the Gaza Strip, 187 were approved.  According to data published by the Red 
Cross, between 1967 and 1987, 140,000 requests for family unification were submitted; of these only some 19,000 were 
approved. See B’Tselem, Renewal of Deportation of Women and Children from the West Bank on Account of "Illegal Residency, 8-9, 
1991, http://www.btselem.org/Download/199110_Renewal_of_Deportation_Eng.doc. 
According to a more recent report, B’Tselem documented how Israel started since 1993 to set up quota for family 
unification cases to be 2000 which did not meet the real need of the population. In 1995, the PA demanded that Israel 
cancel the annual quota, or at least increase it substantially. Israel refused. In protest, in early 1996, the PA refused to 
forward family unification requests to Israel for approval. It was not until early 1998 that the PA again forwarded 
requests to Israel, which were based on the quota that had been set in 1993. According to press reports, in mid-1998, 
Israel and the PA had more than 17,500 requests for family unification waiting to be processed. In October 1998, in the 
framework of the Wye Agreement between Israel and the PA, Israel raised the quota to 3,000 a year. In early 2000, in the 
framework of peace negotiations between the parties, Israel again raised the quota, to 4,000 a year. This policy remained 
in effect until the outbreak of the second intifada, in September of that year. Following the outbreak of the second 
Intifada in September 2000, the process of family unification was frozen. See B'Tselem, supra note 37, at 13.  
In 2007, Israel started again to receive requests for family unification and many thousands have received approval. As 
reported to be the official number, the PA talks about some 54000 Palestinians who entered the occupied Palestinian 
territory since early 1990 and who are considered by Israel as illegal. The news was reported online, see, i.g., 
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5iELL0iiiiCoG2eVFkFjCAi6fAYHw  
42 As recognized by ISC decision 106/1986, cited in SHAML, supra note 21, at 103.  
43 As recognized by ISC decision 90/1979, cited in id. at 102.  
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the “fear of the demographic growth of the population in the territories”.44 According to this 
narrative, what may appear as an oscillation in attitude of Israeli authorities towards family 
unification requests is not necessarily indicative of change of policy but rather used as a technique to 
temper pressures against its policies, whether internationally or internally.45 One thing is certain, 
though. Even when family unification requests are successful, they remain complex, long and costly. 
As a consequence, many had been discouraged to proceed or pursue the application, preferring to 
remain in the irregularity, with all the fragility, instability and immobility it causes.  
In order to enter the occupied Palestinian territory, non-resident Palestinians need a temporary 
visitors’ permit, often granted for a period of three months by the Israeli authorities – similar to 
foreigners. Hence, they need to renew their permit, or travel abroad and return back – hoping to be 
readmitted again with a new three-month temporary permit. Whenever visitors overstayed their 
permit they became illegally present and, if they exit the ‘Area’, they can be sure that they will most 
likely be denied visitors’ permits in the future.  
Since having a visitor’s permit is a pre-requisite in the process of an approved family unification 
process,46 the fact that some are denied temporary visa to enter the ‘Area’ may be a determinant 
factor for unsuccessful family unification. Israel had frozen the issuance of visit permits in different 
occasions.47 Many foreign spouses of Palestinian residents were affected. In 2006, following Hamas’ 
victory in legislative elections, Israel intensified its restrictions. In 2007, some 200 short extensions 
of visas were issued, largely upon pressures from different countries as a result of protest initiatives 
undertaken against such policies.48 In other words, even when family unification is approved, one 
needs to obtain a short visitors’ permit first; if denied, then the family unification is indirectly 
affected by the mere fact of not being able to physically enter the ‘Area’. As for those who entered 
                                               
44 B'Tselem, supra note 41, at 9. 
45 See SHAML, supra note 21, at 106. For more details about Israeli policies to family unification, see generally B'Tselem, 
supra note 37, at 15-6.  
46 See id. at 4. 
47 At a meeting held on 20 December 2005, the coordinator of government operations in the Territories, Major-General 
Yusef Mishlav, informed HaMoked that “the freeze on issuing visitor’s permits… had been removed, and a number of 
categories for granting visitor’s permits were set, including persons invited by Abu Mazen, humanitarian cases, entry of foreign 
spouses, and investors.” This was not the reality, however. Apparently, the “compromise” does not cover more than a few 
hundred visitor’s permits, among them permits intended to enable the registration of children who were born abroad 
where one of their parents is a resident of the Occupied Territories, and, in the case mentioned by Major-General 
Mishlav, of members of an orchestra that wanted to perform in the West Bank. Id. at 24.  
48 See Amnesty International, supra note 39, at 3.  
 This paper is still a draft, please do not cite without author’s permission. Asem Khalil, April 2010.  Page 16 
 
the ‘Area’ with a short visitors’ permit and overstayed while waiting for the outcome of their family 
unification request, they risk being denied the status of resident through family unification 
altogether.49  
VII. What about Palestinians of Gaza and East Jerusalem? 
The following are some of the main issues regarding movement of Palestinians within the West 
Bank, including East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip, change of residency address and family unification 
that involves marriages between residents of those three territories under different legal regimes.  
The West Bank and Gaza Strip are deemed, according to Oslo Accords, as one unit.50  Together 
with East Jerusalem, they form the territorial claim for Palestinian statehood, within the two-state 
solution. This aspirational unity however is challenged by the de facto and de iure separation that took 
place in 1948 when the West Bank and Gaza Strip fell respectively under Jordanian and Egyptian 
rules.  
After the Israeli occupation in 1967, the two territories were declared closed military areas, while 
East Jerusalem was annexed to Israel. In 1972 ‘a general exit permit’ was issued for the two areas.51 
This marked a change in policy with regards to permitting movement between the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip, and the way change of the residency place in the population registry took place. In 
January 1991 (during the Gulf War), Israel cancelled the general exit permit of 1972. From that date 
on, any resident of the occupied Palestinian territory who wanted to enter Israel needed to obtain an 
individualized permit.52  
The cancellation of the general exit permit marked the consolidation of the closure policy between 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and between both territories and Israel (including East Jerusalem). In 
March 1993 Israel imposed a ‘general closure’ on the Occupied Territories, which still remains in 
place.53 The closure added difficulty for Palestinians to change their residency from one area to the 
other. Changing an address listed on an ID card became a long and complicated procedure, and 
                                               
49 B'Tselem, supra note 37, at 4. 
50 Article IV of the Declaration of Principles of 1993 reads as follows: “Jurisdiction of the Council will cover WB and 
GS territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. The two sides view the WB 
and the GS as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period.”  
51 In the West Bank it was through Order no. 34, in Gaza Strip it was through Order no.2 of 1972.  
52 See Abu Mukh, supra note 35, at 6.  
53 See id.  
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many requests for address changes were rejected.54 This situation worsened after the second intifada. 
Palestinians of Gaza Strip who failed to update their place of residence in the West Bank were 
expelled to Gaza Strip because they were considered as staying illegally in the West Bank! Some 
other Palestinians of the West Bank were expelled to Gaza Strip as a punishment while others were 
forbidden from returning to the West Bank after a visit to Gaza Strip.55  
Following the disengagement plan carried out unilaterally by Israel in 2005, the Israeli Military 
Government in Gaza Strip officially came to an end.56 In 2007, after Hamas took control of 
Palestinian Authority institutions, Israel declared Gaza an ‘enemy entity’. The movement between 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip through Israel became almost impossible. It also became more 
complicated to obtain a change of residence from Gaza Strip to the West Bank. For this reason, 
families composed of Palestinians holding West Bank ID cards and Gaza Strip ID cards are now 
facing similar challenges to those families with a non-resident spouse. 
Families with a spouse from the West Bank or Gaza Strip and the other from East Jerusalem, face 
similar challenges. Recently, the Israeli Supreme Court rejected a petition against the temporary 
order 2003 (The Nationality and Entry into Israel Law, published on 6 August 2003). That law 
prevents Palestinians from the occupied Palestinian territory to enter Israel, thus forbidding family 
unification between Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem and their Palestinian spouses residing in 
the occupied Palestinian territory.57 If those Palestinians holding a Jerusalem ID card decide to move 
their residency to the ‘Area’, they risk having their Jerusalem ID card revoked.   
VIII. Conclusion: Military Orders, Law, and Legality 
During the Second World War, Lord Atkin famously contradicted Cicero’s 2000-year-old dictum 
(Silent enim leges inter arma),58 when he said: “In this country, amid the clash of arms the laws are not 
                                               
54 See B'Tselem and Hamoked, One Big Prison: Freedom of Movement to and from the Gaza Strip on the Eve of the Disengagement 
Plan, 5-6, 2005,  http://www.btselem.org/Download/200503_Gaza_Prison_English.doc.  
55 See id. at 16-9.  
56 See Abu Mukh, supra note 35, at 16.  
57 See id. at 9.  
58 Quoted in: Aharon Barak, The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy and the Fight Against Terrorism, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
125, 130 (2003). 
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silent. They may be changed, but they speak the same language in war as in peace.”59 In 
contemporary states, it is rare to rule by brutal force, in times of emergencies, threats to national 
security, or even in times of occupation of an alien population. Israel indeed ruled the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip using law and legality. Changes to local Palestinian legal and judicial systems were 
often introduced through military orders.  
According to Brigadier General Uri Shoham – the IDF Military Advocate General between 1995 
and 2000 – “all Israeli governments from 1967 to the present have laid down a strict requirement 
that all activities of the Israeli military in the control of the Territories must adhere to the principle 
of “the rule of law,” for as the philosopher John Locke said in 1690, “Wherever law ends, tyranny 
begins.””60 It is this concern that explains why Israel insisted to use military orders at first place 
(legislative-like enactments) to rule the areas under its control. Israel opted to rule the occupied 
Palestinian territory through law. The fact that Israel created civil administration to administer civil 
affairs, and established military courts with some rules for ensuring minimal defense in a due process 
like form, may suggest that Israel decided somehow that the IDF be ruled by law also. 
Though, there are different examples in the literature that suggest how Israeli military orders fail the 
test of legality. Some used Fuller’s inner morality of law expressly;61 while others used one of the 
Fuller’s eight principles as criteria to judge the legality of Israeli military actions in the occupied 
Palestinian territory.62 However, the large part of the literature uses positivistic approach as their 
point of reference in respect to IDF obligations under international law, Israeli domestic law, and 
the local legal systems in the ‘Area’.63 For many human rights organizations and advocates, the 
insistence was on the way law is enforced. The due process of law as much as the well-functioning 
                                               
59 Quoted in: Rt. Hon. Lord Lowry, National Security and the Rule of Law, 26 ISR. L. REV. 117, 119 (1992). For a discussion, 
see generally David Dyzenhaus, Intimations of Legality amid the Clash of Arms, 2 I.CON 244  (2004). 
60  Uri Shoham, The Principle of Legality and the Israeli Military Government in the Territories, MIL. L. REV. 153, 153-273 (1996). 
61 See, e.g., John Quigley, Review: West Bank: Israel's Abuse of Law, 10 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES 118,  119. 
62 See, e.g., RAJA SHEHADEH, OCCUPIER'S LAW: ISRAEL AND THE WEST BANK 63-75 (Rev. Ed., Washington D.C., 
Institute for Palestine Studies 1988); Anis F. Kassim, Legal Systems and Developments in Palestine, 1 PAL. Y.B. INT'L L. 19, 32 
(1984); John Quigley, Living in Legal Limbo: Israel's Settlers in Occupied Palestinian Territory, 10 PACE INT’L L. REV. 1 (1998). 
63 Se, e.g., Mona Rishmawi, Administrative Detention in International Law: The Case of the Israeli Occupied West Bank and Gaza, 5 
Pal. Y.B. Int'l L. 83 (1989). Other scholars inquires the respect of international humanitarian law by Israel, see, e.g., 
Amichai Cohen, Administering the Territories: An Inquiry into the Application of International Humanitarian Law by IDF in the 
Occupied Territories, 38 Is.L.R. 24 (2005); Orna Ben-Naftali and Keren R. Michaeli, 'We Must Not Make a Scarecrow of the 
Law': A Legal Analysis of the Israeli Policy of Targeted Killings, 36 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 233 (2003). 
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of courts (whether Palestinian local courts, or Israeli military courts) constitute the central point to 
any conception of legality.  
Without underestimating the above arguments, it is nonetheless still possible that Israel undertakes – 
whether as a matter of law, or simply as a matter of fact –steps to overcome the critiques and 
ameliorate its way of making law and applying it. One can argue that the newly adopted Order no. 
1650 was adopted by the IDF commander, enabled by Declaration no. 2 of 1967 – deemed 
declaratory of a fact not constitutive of power.64 In other words, the Israeli occupation would be 
considered as a simple change in the grundnorm – as Kelsen would put it. Accordingly, whenever 
inferior norms are adopted in accordance with it, then the order creates real rules of law. Besides, 
this order entered into effect after six months of its adoption. In different aspects this order may be 
considered as satisfying some if not most of Fuller’s desiderata. It is possible also to argue that this 
order ameliorated the way justice will be served, since it includes several guarantees that fits within 
the requirements of a ‘due process’. Although one may find it unconvincing, the above demonstrates 
that those formal criteria for how the law is made and applied are arguably possible to realize, at least 
theoretically. Still, can we say that – as the IDF advocate general had suggested – that this is what 
legality is all about and that this is what Rule of Law means? 
My suggestion is to distinguish between rule by and through law and Rule of Law.65 Rule by and through 
law are part of what is arguably called ‘formal conceptions’ of legality. The second is substantial 
                                               
64 As defended by Meir Shamgar (by then the Military Advocate General) in which he argued that “proclamation was not 
constitutive but only declaratory.” Meir Shamgar, Legal Concepts and Problems of the Israeli Military Government - The Initial 
Stage, in MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL 1967 - 1980: THE LEGAL ASPECTS 
13, 14 (Meir Shamgar ed., Jerusalem, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1982). 
65 The rule by law means that the government itself subjects its will power to the constraints of the law and the rule 
through law means that the acts of domination must acquire the form of the law. For Preuss, those are the “twofold 
meaning” of the rule of law. See Ulrich K Preuss, The political meaning of constitutionalism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, 
DEMOCRACY AND SOVEREIGNTY: AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 11, 16 (Richard Bellamy ed., Averbury 
1996). 
However, as rightly pointed out by Jeffrey Kahn, the rule by law and the rule through law describe a political system in 
which statutes and other legislation are the supreme authority in the state by virtue of adherence to a formal legislative 
process of passing statutes and other legal acts. For Kahn, this system represents a Rechtsstaat but not a rule of law. See 
Jeffrey Kahn, The Search for the Rule of Law in Russia, 37 GEORGETOWN J. INT. L. 353, 364 (2006).  
In this paper we adopt a concept of the rule of law similar to Kahn, not Preuss. To my understanding, early positivist, 
such as the eighteenth century utilitarian theorist and reformer, Bentham, would have individualized principles needed 
for controlling the abuse of power. Hart for example believed that in Bentham work it is possible indeed to identify the 
elements of Rechtstaat. For him, those principles are now revived by natural law theorists. H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the 
Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 71 593, 595 (1958). 
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conceptions of legality. Formal conceptions differ on many issues but they may be grouped under 
one same umbrella because they are somehow value or content-free. Legality is simply converted 
into respecting certain principles or criteria for making new rules of law and in applying those same 
rules whenever conflict arises. On the contrary, substantial conceptions look beyond the form of 
rule making and applying to reach the values behind them.  
I claim – although not in the measure right now to develop it further – that the formal conceptions 
of legality do not provide an adequate tool for deciding on the nature of military orders, and the 
attitude towards them. Such analysis is unsatisfactory because it does not deal with the substance but 
only with the form of rules. A positivist approach to legality is incapable of explaining the original 
sin of the new legal system, and the possibility of building legality over an illegal act of occupation.66 
The inner morality of law in Fuller’s terms cannot escape recognizing a colonial law, or an apartheid 
law, whenever the standards of the inner morality of law are respected. Finally, even legality as 
procedures and due process is incapable of dealing with ‘justice’ administered under occupation, the 
opposite of justice.67  
It seems absolutely absurd to be neutral towards those enactments, simply because such military 
enactments are often used to realize colonial objectives, rather than the Palestinian people’s interest: 
land is expropriated from Palestinians,68 where Israeli settlements are built instead,69 water rights 
largely curtailed,70 houses demolished,71 Palestinians detained by administrative procedures72 while 
                                                                                                                                                       
 Accordingly, it is possible to conclude that the rule of law goes beyond the limits imposed by the state itself in the way it 
makes laws, execute them, or apply them. In such a system, “the state is not the sole source of law and adherence to 
procedural formality is necessary but not sufficient for law to be made.” Kahn, supra, at 364.  
66 About the illegality of occupation, see generally, Ben-Naftali, Gross and Michael, supra note 63.  
67 Even the role of Israeli High Court of Justice may lead to undermining the fact of occupation. As pointed out by 
Martti Koskenniemi: “The acceptability of the use of discretion by a law-applying institution such as the Israeli High 
Court of Justice is based on the assumption that its preferences and moral sensibilities are broadly reflective of the 
preferences and sensibilities of the community in which it exercises its jurisdiction. When jurisdiction is exercised in 
conditions of occupation, however, such consensus cannot be easily presumed. On the contrary, recourse to moral 
pathos by an institution of the occupying power will appear to normalize its jurisdiction and add an element of hypocrisy 
to the felt illegitimacy of its possessing jurisdiction in the first place. Moreover, it will undermine the moral and political 
significance of the fact of the occupation, even diminishing the urgency of bringing it to an end.” Martti Koskenniemi, 
Occupied Zone - "A Zone of Reasonableness"? 41 Isr. L. Rev. 13, 13 (2008) (emphasis omitted).  
68 See Shehadeh, supra note 62, at 42-3.  
69 See generally Quigley, supra note 62.; Sabri Jiryis, Settlers' Law: Seizure of Palestinian Lands, 2 PAL. Y.B. INT'L L. 17 (1985); 
Ben-Naftali, Gross and Michael, supra note 63, at 579-88.  
70 See generally Jeffrey D. Dillman, Water Rights in the Occupied Territories, 19 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES 46 (1989); 
Iain Scobbie, H2O after Oslo II: Legal Aspects of Water in the Occupied Territories, 8 PAL. Y.B. INT'L L. 70 (1994-1995).  
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others targeted and killed, without due process.73 It is also by military orders that freedoms (of 
movement, of religion, of the press, of opinion, and so on) are restricted.74 It is through military 
orders that persons are denied reentry to the West Bank and Gaza Strip,75 access to East Jerusalem,76 
families are separated,77 Palestinians denationalized,78 workers denied access to their place of work, 
farmers to their land, and students to their schools.79  
In this paper I have showed how Israel used law and legality (in the above formal conceptions) to 
realize its discriminatory policies in the occupied Palestinian territories. It is through military orders 
that Palestinians were denied registration, treated as foreigners in their home country, denied reentry, 
deported and denied family unification. Through military orders, Israel regulated ways ‘lawful’ 
documentation is granted, and through military orders also converted those who cannot prove 
having ‘lawful’ documentation into illegally present in the territories, and then criminalized, 
imprisoned and deported them.  
The three formal conceptions of legality do not seem to deal with the core issue at hand, and will 
leave us unsatisfied and unable to see how to deal with those law-like enactments. Such conceptions 
simply facilitate Israeli control of the Palestinian population and land.80 It provided the occupation 
with a very sophisticated tool to violate what may be considered as basic rights of the Palestinians, as 
                                                                                                                                                       
71 For a discussion of Israeli practice of house demolitions, see generally, Brian Farrell, Israeli Demolition of Palestinian Houses 
as a Punitive Measure: Application of International Law to Regulation 119, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 871 (2002-2003); Usama R. 
Halabi, Demolition and Sealing of Houses in the Israeli Occupied Territories: A Critical Legal Analysis, 5 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 
251 (1991). 
72 See generally Rishmawi, supra note 63.  
73 See generally see generally, Ben-Naftali, Gross and Michael, supra note 63. 
74 See Quigley, supra note 61, at 119.  
75 See generally Asem Khalil, The Circulation of Palestinian Refugees and Migrants (San Domenico di Fiesole, Robert Shuman 
Center for Advances Studies, CARIM Analytic and Synthetic Notes 2008/33, 2008).   
76 For more about the status of East Jerusalem under international law, see generally Joseph B. Tulman, The International 
Legal Status of Jerusalem, 39 ASILS Int’l L.J. 39 (1997); Antonio Cassese, Legal Considerations on the International Status of 
Jerusalem, 3 PAL. Y.B. INT'L L. 13 (1986); Moshe Hirsch, The Legal Status of Jerusalem Following the ICJ Advisory Opinion on the 
Separation Barrier, 38 ISR. L. REV. 298 (2005).  
77 See generally John Quigley, Family Reunion and the Right to Return to Occupied Territory, 6 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 223 (1992). 
78 See generally Victor Kattan, The Nationality of Denationalized Palestinians, 74 NORDIC JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
67 (2005). 
79 Most recently the building of the separation wall has aggravated the situation in the day-to-day life of Palestinian 
population of the West Bank. See supra note 33.  
80 See George E Bisharat, Land, Law, and Legitimacy in Israel and the Occupied Territories, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 467 (1994); 
Shehadeh, supra note 62, at 4-5.  
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a people or as individuals. Only a substantial conception of the Rule of Law - in which freedom and 
rights are integrated in the same concept of legality – that it is possible to avoid converting law, 
especially positive law to a tool for discrimination, apartheid and colonialism, and to avoid reducing 
legality to legalism.  
Israel had used law and legality to rule the territories under its control. Using legality contributed 
largely to maintaining the occupation, illegal itself. Such a system of Mis-Rule of Law81 coexisted 
with oppression, restriction of freedoms, and dispossession of rights. It led to the normalization of 
the ‘exception’ in the day-to-day politics.82 In times of occupation, laws have spoken; and they have 
spoken disturbingly loud. They are oppressive and pervasive of all aspects of individuals’ lives. For 
those who live under the heavy burden of those laws, the language is still the same, as much as the 
mistrust. 
 
 
                                               
81 See generally Anver Emon, The (Mis)Rule of Law in the Occupied Territories: A Summary of Findings, 60 GUILD PRAC. 80 
(2003). 
82 See generally, Ben-Naftali, Gross and Michael, supra note 63, at 605-8.  
